Probability, Minimax Approximation and Nash-Equilibrium. Estimating the
  Parameter of a Biased Coin by Benko, D. et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
60
5.
08
72
1v
3 
 [m
ath
.PR
]  
13
 Fe
b 2
01
8
PROBABILITY, MINIMAX APPROXIMATION AND
NASH-EQUILIBRIUM. ESTIMATING THE PARAMETER
OF A BIASED COIN
D. BENKO, D. COROIAN, P. D. DRAGNEV †, AND R. ORIVE ∗
Abstract. This paper deals with the application of Approximation
Theory type techniques to study a classical problem in Probability: es-
timating the parameter of a biased coin. For this purpose, a Minimax
Estimation problem is considered and the characterization of the op-
timal estimator is shown, together with the weak asymptotics of such
optimal choices as the number of coin tosses approaches infinity; in addi-
tion, a number of numerical examples and graphs are displayed. At the
same time, the problem is also discussed from the Game Theory view-
point, as a non-cooperative, two–player game, and a Nash-equilibrium
is established. The particular case of n = 2 tosses is completely solved.
“ Dedicated to Prof. Walter Gautschi on the occasion of his 90-th birth-
day.”
1. Introduction
The following problem is well-known in the area of Probability. A biased
coin is given, but the probability of heads is unknown. We flip it n times and
get k heads. The problem is to estimate the probability of heads. The most
typical approach to solve this problem is the Maximum Likelihood method
(see e.g. [13] or [20]). Let p = P (heads). Then
P (k heads out of n tosses) =
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k.
Since we have absolutely no information about p, we choose an estima-
tor p̂ ∈ [0, 1] for which this expression is maximal, that is, p̂ = k/n. This
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approach has several shortcomings. 1.) For small n we get unrealistic es-
timations. For example, if n = 1 and we get a head, the method gives the
estimation p = 1, and if we get a tail, the method gives p = 0. 2.) the
method yields the most likely value of p, but does not take into account
the error in the estimation. This can be seen in the following example:
suppose we flip the coin n = 4 times and get k = 2 heads; of course,
p̂ = .5. However, while in the literature a coin is often considered “rea-
sonably fair” when .45 ≤ p ≤ .55, in this case it is easy to check that
P ((|p − .5| > .05) | (n = 4, k = 2)) = .8137... , assuming p is chosen follow-
ing a uniform distribution, and, thus, the probability of dealing with a biased
coin is high despite the Maximum Likelihood estimator.
Another approach for estimating the probability p of a biased coin deals
with Bayesian or Minimax Estimation. While in the former the goal is min-
imizing the average risk, in the latter the aim is to minimize the maximum
risk; nevertheless, there are other well-known methods, such as the so-called
Uniform Minimum Variance Unbiased (UMVU) estimator (for more infor-
mation, see [13]). These methods require the use of a loss function, which
measures the difference between the parameter and its estimator. In the
current paper, the loss function |p − ai| will be considered, where ai is the
estimation of p if i heads are obtained after n tosses, for i = 0, . . . , n . Then,
the expected value of this loss function, commonly called risk or penalty
function, is given by
(1.1) D(a0, ..., an; p) :=
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k|p − ak|
and our goal will be to choose ai’s that minimize the sup-norm of D. Figure
1 below, corresponding to the case of n = 5 tosses, illustrates the motivation
for our analysis. It shows the penalty functions for the Maximum Likelihood
choice (i.e. ak = k/n , k = 0, . . . , n) and for the choice of the ai’s we will
prove to be optimal (see Section 2). Indeed, the sup-norm of the penalty
function D for the optimal choice is clearly smaller than the one correspond-
ing to the Maximum Likelihood approach. Moreover, Figure 1 shows that
the optimal choice satisfies what we call hereafter the “equimax” property.
This is very similar to the characterization of the set of interpolation nodes
to reach the optimal Lebesgue function, as conjectured by Bernstein and
Erdo˝s and proved forty years later by Kilgore [12] and de Boor-Pinkus [3].
This similarity served as an important motivation to apply Approximation
Theory type techniques for investigating this problem, and will be discussed
in more detail in Section 2.
It is worth pointing out that in the Statistics literature one often prefers
the use of squares instead of absolute values in (1.1), that is, the minimiza-
tion of
(1.2) D̂(a0, ..., an; p) :=
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k(p− ak)2 , p ∈ [0, 1] ,
PROBABILITY, MINIMAX APPROXIMATION 3
Figure 1. Graph of D(a0, ..., an; p) in the case of n = 5
tosses: Maximum Likelihood (green), optimal choice (red),
and the maximum value of the penalty function for the op-
timal choice (black)
is considered, because of its analytical tractability and easier computa-
tions. Indeed, for the penalty function (1.2) the optimal (minimax) strategy
{a0, . . . , an} is explicitly computed (see [13]):
(1.3) ak =
1
2
+
√
n
1 +
√
n
(
k
n
− 1
2
)
, k = 0, . . . , n .
Of course, this is the optimal strategy when measuring the loss using the
least squares norm, but not in our “uniform” setting. In Figure 2 below, we
augment Figure 1 with the plot of the penalty function D for the strategy
(1.3).
As it can be seen in Figure 2, the behavior of the Squared Error Minimax
Estimator (hereafter, SEME) is similar, or even a bit better, towards the
center of the interval, but clearly worse when we are close to the endpoints of
the interval. Thus, for n = 5, the sup-norm of the penalty function D for the
SEME is 0.1545, while for our Absolute Error Minimax Estimator (AEME)
is 0.131. More generally, as mentioned above, along with the Minimax
Estimators, the so-called Bayes Estimators are also often employed (see
[13, Ch. 4]). In this setting, given a loss function R(θ, δ), some “prior”
distribution Λ for the parameter θ to be determined (in our case, θ = p) is
selected, and the estimator δΛ is chosen in order to minimize the weighted
average risk
(1.4) r(λ, δ) =
∫
R(θ, δ) dΛ(θ),
also called Bayes risk. As established in [13, Theorem 5.1.4] and some corol-
laries, in certain situations a Bayes estimator is also a Minimax estimator.
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Figure 2. Graph of D(a0, ..., an; p) in the case of n = 5
tosses: Maximum Likelihood (green), optimal choice (red),
and the quadratic optimal choice (blue)
This connection will be used below (Section 4) when discussing the interpre-
tation of our method within the framework of Game Theory. Thus, roughly
speaking, we can say that in this paper we are dealing with a “multi-faceted”
topic, which we investigate from the points of view of Point Estimation The-
ory, Approximation Theory, and Game Theory.
On the other hand, the problem of estimating the probability of a coin
(more generally, the parameter of a Bernoulli distribution) from a few tosses
has been often considered as a toy-model for randomization processes and
for checking the effectiveness of different methods in statistical inference.
In this sense, it is noteworthy that some recent papers have dealt with the
problem of simulating a coin with a certain prescribed probability f(p), by
using a coin whose probability is actually p (see [9] and [15]). Actually, this
idea comes from a seminal paper by von Neumann [18]. In [9] and [15] the
authors also show, just as we do in the current paper, the utility of techniques
from Approximation Theory to solving problems from Probability.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, our minimax estima-
tion is thoroughly studied and the optimal choice is established by Theorem
2.2, which represents the main result of this paper. Some computational
results are included. The asymptotic distribution of the set of nodes corre-
sponding to such optimal strategies, when the number of tosses approaches
infinity, is established in Section 3. In Section 4 we discuss the problem
from the Game Theory standpoint, as a non-cooperative two-player game,
which is described in detail. Also, the existence of a Nash-equilibrium is
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established. Furthermore, in Section 5, this Nash-equilibrium is explicitly
solved for the case of n = 2 tosses. In both Sections 4 and 5, the solution
of this Nash-equilibrium problem is related to the connection between Min-
imax and Bayes estimators. Finally, the last section contains some further
remarks and conclusions.
2. The minimax estimation
As it was discussed above, the optimal strategy we consider is to choose
a0, . . . , an ∈ [0, 1] in order to minimize the sup-norm of the penalty function
D(a0, . . . , an; p). Thus, our minimax problem has a striking resemblance
with the well-known problem of the optimization of the Lebesgue function
in polynomial interpolation. Indeed, let us consider the polynomial interpo-
lation of a function f over a set of nodes x0, . . . , xn ∈ [0, 1]. By the classical
Lagrange formula, we know the expression of such interpolating polynomial
is:
Ln(f ;x0, . . . , xn;x) =
n∑
k=0
f(xk) lk(x0, . . . , xn;x) ,
where lk(x0, . . . , xn;x), k = 0, . . . , n, are the well-known Lagrange interpo-
lation polynomials, and they form a basis for Pn, the space of polynomials
of degree less than or equal to n. Since the norm of the projection operator
from C[0, 1], the space of all continuous functions on [0, 1], onto Pn is given
by the sup-norm of the Lebesgue function
(2.1) Λ(x0, . . . , xn;x) =
n∑
k=0
|lk(x0, . . . , xn;x)| ,
the problem of finding optimal choices of nodes x0, . . . , xn ∈ [0, 1] minimizing
the sup-norm of (2.1) arises in a natural way. It is well known that if the
endpoints of the interval belong to the set of nodes, then the solution is
unique. As for the characterization of the solution, the famous Bernstein-
Erdo˝s conjecture asserted that for an optimal choice, the corresponding
Lebesgue function (2.1) must exhibit the following “equimax” property: If
the absolute maximum of Λ(x0, . . . , xn;x) on each subinterval [xi−1, xi] is
denoted by λi = λi(x0, . . . , xn) , i = 1, . . . , n then we have:
λ1 = . . . = λn.
This conjecture was finally proved by Kilgore [12] (see also [3]).
Now, the following result shows that the above mentioned resemblance
between both minimax problems can be extended to the characterization of
the optimal solutions. Let f(p) := D(a0, . . . , an; p) be an optimal penalty
function in the sense of minimizing the sup-norm of (1.1). Then, the fol-
lowing result, which gathers some necessary conditions to be satisfied for
an optimal choice {a0, . . . , an} , will be useful. It will be stated without
assuming that the points are “well-ordered”, i.e. that a0 < a1 < . . . < an.
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Although this fact may seem obvious, it does require a proof (see Theorem
2.2 below).
Lemma 2.1. Let
(2.2) M(f) := {x ∈ [0, 1] : f(x) = ‖f‖∞}
be the set of absolute maxima of an optimal penalty function f . Then,
(i) M(f) ∩ {a0, ..., an} = ∅.
(ii) M(f) ∩ [0,min{ai}) 6= ∅ , M(f) ∩ (max{ai}, 1] 6= ∅ .
(iii) a0 ≤ 1/2 ≤ an and M(f) ∩ (a0, an) 6= ∅ .
Proof. The proof of part (i) easily follows from the fact that, from (1.1), the
derivative f ′(p) has a positive jump as p passes through ai and, thus, f(p)
cannot be increasing/decreasing as we pass through ai.
As for part (ii), suppose thatM(f)∩[0,min{ai}) = ∅. Then, max
[0,min{ai})
f(p) <
‖f‖∞. Since by (i), min{ai} 6∈ M(f), we have that there is a δ > 0 s.t.
max
[0,min{ai}+δ]
f(p) < ‖f‖∞. But then, ‖D(a0, a1, . . . ,min{ai}+δ, . . . , an; p)‖∞ <
‖f‖∞, which contradicts the optimality of f(p). The argument that M(f)∩
[max{ai}, 1) 6= ∅ is similar.
To prove (iii) we first notice that a0 ≤ 1/2 ≤ an. Indeed, it is easily seen that
‖D(1/2, . . . , 1/2; p)‖∞ ≤ 1/2, which implies that ‖f‖∞ ≤ 1/2. Therefore,
a0 = f(0) ≤ ‖f‖∞ ≤ 1/2. Similarly, 1 − an = f(1) ≤ 1/2, and thus
a0 ≤ 1/2 ≤ an. We note that, as a consequence, we also have that min{ai} ≤
a0 ≤ 1/2 ≤ an ≤ max{ai}.
Suppose now that M(f)∩ [a0, an] = ∅. Since ai 6∈M(f), there is δ > 0, such
that [a0 − δ, an + δ] ∩M(f) = ∅. Using a similar argument as in the proof
of (ii), we have that for ǫ > 0 small enough and 0 ≤ p ≤ a0 − δ < 1/2,
D(a0 − ǫ, . . . , an + ǫ, . . . , an; p) = D(a0, . . . , an; p)− ǫ [(1− p)n − pn]
< D(a0, . . . , an; p)
We can also prove the same inequality for an + δ < p ≤ 1 from which we
conclude that
‖D(a0 − ǫ, a1, . . . , an−1, an + ǫ; p)‖∞ < ‖D(a0, . . . , an; p)‖∞ = ‖f‖∞,
which is a contradiction with the optimality of f . 
The following theorem establishes the equimax property for our minimax
estimation and represents one of the two main results of this paper, the
other being Theorem 3.4. In addition, the “well-ordering” of such optimal
choice is also proved.
Theorem 2.2. Suppose that
(2.3) f(p) := D(a0, . . . , an; p) = D(T ; p)
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is an optimal penalty function. Then the node set T satisfies a0 < a1 <
· · · < an and the equimax property holds, that is: M(f) ∩ (ai, ai+1) 6= ∅,
i = 0, . . . , n− 1.
Proof. First, we will prove that for an optimal penalty function D(T ; p) the
node set T is well-ordered, i.e. ai ≤ ai+1 for all i = 0, . . . , n − 1. Indeed,
suppose it is not. Then there is an index i < n such that ai > ai+1. We will
perturb the node set T to obtain a penalty function with smaller norm.
Select ǫ > 0 small enough so that ‖f‖ > f(p) for p ∈ (ai − ψ, ai + ψ) ∪
(ai+1 − δ, ai+1 + δ), where
(2.4) ψ := ǫ (ai + ai+1)/(2− ai − ai+1) , δ := ǫ (i+ 1)/(n − i)
and max(ψ, δ) < (ai − ai+1)/2. Denote by Tǫ the node set obtained by
perturbing the nodes ai and ai+1 to ai−ψ and ai+1+ δ, respectively. Then,
from (1.1), we have
D(Tǫ; p)−D(T ; p) = ǫ
(
n
i
)
pi(1− p)n−ig(p),
where
g(p) :=

− ai + ai+1
2− ai − ai+1 +
p
1− p, p ≤ ai+1
− ai + ai+1
2− ai − ai+1 −
p
1− p, ai+1 + δ ≤ p ≤ ai − ψ
ai + ai+1
2− ai − ai+1 −
p
1− p, p ≥ ai ,
and using the fact that x/(1 − x) is an increasing function, it is easy to see
that g(p) < 0 for all p ∈ [0, 1] \{(ai−ψ, ai)∪ (ai+1, ai+1+ δ)}. Additionally,
as f(p) < ‖f‖ on (ai − ψ, ai + ψ) ∪ (ai+1 − δ, ai+1 + δ), by selecting ǫ > 0
smaller if needed, we can guarantee ‖D(Tǫ; p)‖ < ‖f‖, a contradiction with
the optimality of f . This implies that for optimal penalty function the node
set T is well-ordered, i.e. a0 < a1 < · · · < an.
Next, we prove the equimax property. Denote the global maxima on the
consecutive subintervals by µ−1 := max[0,a0] f(p), µj := max[aj ,aj+1] f(p),
j = 0, 2, . . . , n − 1, and µn := max[an,1] f(p). We want to show that µ0 =
· · · = µn−1 = ‖f‖∞ (we already know from Lemma 2.1 that µ−1 = µn =
‖f‖∞).
By contradiction, assume that for some i ∈ {0, . . . , n−1}we have µi < ‖f‖∞.
Then, as in the first part of the proof, we will construct a perturbation of
the initial set of nodes, Tǫ, for which the corresponding penalty function has
a smaller norm.
Fix ǫ > 0 small enough so that µi(Tǫ) < ‖f‖∞, where Tǫ := {a0, . . . , ai −
ψ, ai+1 + δ, . . . , an}, with δ and ψ given in (2.4) (notice that now we are
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Figure 3. The case of
n = 3 tosses
Figure 4. The case of
n = 4 tosses
enlarging the original interval, while above it was shortened). We will show
that µk(Tǫ) < µk(T ) for all k, from which we will obtain ‖D(Tǫ; p‖ < ‖f‖∞,
a contradiction with the optimality of f .
Indeed, let q ∈ [ak, ak+1] be such that D(Tǫ; q) = µk(Tǫ). Then
D(Tǫ; q)−D(T ; q) = ǫ
(
n
i
)
qi(1− q)n−ih(q),
where
h(q) :=

− ai + ai+1
2− ai − ai+1 +
q
1− q , q < ai
ai + ai+1
2− ai − ai+1 −
q
1− q , q > ai+1 ,
and, thus, the fact that x/(1 − x) is an increasing function implies that
µk(Tǫ) < µk ≤ ‖f‖∞ for all k 6= i. Since the choice of ǫ implies that
µi(Tǫ) < ‖f‖∞, then we obtain the desired contradiction. 
Example 2.3. The Optimal Penalty Function for some values of n.
For illustration, in Figures 3 - 6 we present the computational results we
obtained for the cases of n = 3, 4, 6, and 7 tosses (the plot for n = 5 was
already shown in Figure 1). They all confirm the conclusions of Theorem 2.2.
In all of these figures, we plot the optimal choice for the penalty function
D(a0, ..., an; p), that is, AEME, (red), the Maximum Likelihood function
(green), and the maximum value of the optimal penalty function (black).
Remark 2.4. It is relevant to point out here that when using the penalty
function D̂ corresponding to the squared error loss function (see (1.2)), it
is shown in [13, Ch. 5] that the related minimax estimation (SEME), given
by (1.3), has a constant risk function, as shown in Figure 7, where the risk
function for SEME (blue) is compared with those for AEME (red) and for
the Maximum Likelihood (hereafter, MLE).
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Figure 5. The case of
n = 6 tosses
Figure 6. The case of
n = 7 tosses
Since a constant function obviously satisfies the equimax property, this
supports our conjecture that this equimax characterization should hold for
Minimax Estimators corresponding to any convex loss function.
Figure 7. Graph of D̂(a0, ..., an; p) in the case of n = 5
tosses: Maximum Likelihood (green), Absolute Error Mini-
max Estimator (red), and the Squared Error Minimax Esti-
mator (blue)
3. The asymptotic behavior of the minimax estimations
In this section we shall consider the limiting distribution of the minimax
estimations as the number of tosses n approaches infinity.
Definition 3.1. For every positive integer n let An := {a0n, a1n, . . . , ann}
denote a minimax estimations set or, simply, a minimax node set, namely
‖D(An, p)‖ := ‖D(a0n, . . . , ann; p)‖ = min
x0,...,xn∈[0,1]
‖D(x0, ..., xn; ·)‖∞.
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Observe, that by Theorem 2.2 the node set An is ordered. Moreover, if
Bn := {k/n}nk=0 denotes the uniform node set corresponding to the Maxi-
mum Likelihood estimation, then
(3.1) ‖D(An, p)‖ ≤ ‖D(Bn, p)‖ = O
(
1√
n
)
−→ 0 as n→∞.
Indeed, the O(1/√n) estimate follows as an application of the Jensen’s
inequality to the convex function f(x) = x2
D(Bn, p)
2 =
(
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k
∣∣∣∣p− kn
∣∣∣∣
)2
≤
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k
(
p− k
n
)2
=
p(1− p)
n
≤ 1
4n
,
where we used the fact that the mean of the binomial distribution is µ = np
and its variance is σ2 = np(1− p).
We will prove (see Theorem 3.4 below) that the ordering of An, established
in Theorem 3.1, and equation (3.1) yield that the limiting distribution is
uniform. For this purpose let us remind the reader the definition of weak∗
convergence of a sequence of measures.
Definition 3.2. Let {µn} be a sequence of measures supported on [0, 1].
We say that it converges weakly (or weak∗) to a measure µ if
(3.2) lim
n→∞
∫ 1
0
f(t) dµn(t) =
∫ 1
0
f(t) dµ(t) for all f ∈ C[0, 1],
where C[0, 1] denotes all continuous functions on [0, 1], or equivalently
(3.3) lim
n→∞
µn([a, b]) = µ([a, b]) for all [a, b] ⊂ [0, 1].
We denote this as
µn
∗−→ µ, as n→∞.
Definition 3.3. Given a finite set Kn := {α0n, α1n, . . . , αnn} we call the
measure
(3.4) δKn :=
1
n+ 1
n∑
j=0
δαjn ,
a normalized counting measure of Kn. Here δx denotes the Dirac-delta mea-
sure at the point x.
Theorem 3.4. Suppose that the node sets Kn := {α0n, α1n, . . . , αnn} ⊂
[0, 1], n = 1, . . . ,∞, are ordered and that
(3.5) lim
n→∞
‖D(Kn, p)‖ = 0.
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Then the asymptotic distribution of Kn, as n tends to infinity, is uniform,
namely
(3.6) δKn
∗−→ dx, as n→∞,
where dx denotes the Lebesgue measure on the interval [0, 1].
Proof. To prove (3.6) it is sufficient to establish that for all 0 < p < 1 we
have
p ≤ lim inf
n→∞
|Kn ∩ [0, p]|
n+ 1
≤ lim sup
n→∞
|Kn ∩ [0, p]|
n+ 1
≤ p.
We shall prove the third inequality, the first being similar and the second
being obvious.
Suppose that there is a 0 < p < 1 for which it fails. Then there is an
ǫ > 0 such that
lim sup
n→∞
|Kn ∩ [0, p]|
n+ 1
> p+ ǫ.
This implies that there is a subsequence {ni} and a number M , such that
(3.7)
|Kni ∩ [0, p]|
ni + 1
> p+
ǫ
2
=: q for all i ≥M.
For every i denote ki := |Kni ∩ [0, p]|. Then the ordering of Kni implies that
|q − αℓ,ni | > ǫ/2 for all ℓ ≤ ki and hence
D(Kni , q) =
ni∑
ℓ=0
(
ni
ℓ
)
qℓ(1− q)ni−ℓ|q − αℓ,ni |
≥
ki∑
ℓ=0
(
ni
ℓ
)
qℓ(1− q)ni−ℓ|q − αℓ,ni |
>
ǫ
2
ki∑
ℓ=0
(
ni
ℓ
)
qℓ(1− q)ni−ℓ > ǫ
4
,
(3.8)
where in the last inequality we apply [10, Theorem 1], using the fact that
(3.7) yields that ki − qni > q. This contradicts (3.5), which proves the
theorem. 
As the minimax node sets An are ordered, (3.1) allows us to establish the
following.
Corollary 3.5. The limiting distribution of the minimax node sets An is
the uniform distribution dx on [0, 1].
Remark 3.6. Observe that Theorem 3.4 establishes that the limiting dis-
tribution is the uniform one not just for the sequence of optimal choices,
but for every sequence of “acceptable” strategies, in the sense that they
are well ordered and the sup-norm of their corresponding penalty functions
approaches zero, as n→∞. Thus, we see that all these acceptable estima-
tors are asymptotically unbiased, in the sense that their limit distribution
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as n→∞, is the uniform distribution, the same as for the Maximum Likeli-
hood estimators, which are the unique unbiased estimators for the parameter
p.
It is also remarkable that this conclusion also holds for the sequence of
Squared Error Minimax Estimators given by (1.3), which is easy to check.
4. A problem in Game Theory
As it was said above, now we are going to see our estimation problem from
the viewpoint of the Game Theory (see e.g. [1], [7] or [19]). In particular,
a non-cooperative, two-player, zero-sum and mixed-strategy game will be
posed, as we explain below.
Indeed, we are dealing with a simple two-player game, where Player I
selects a probability p ∈ [0, 1] and creates a coin such that P (heads) = p.
He tosses the coin n times and provides the number i ∈ {0, 1, ..., n} of heads
observed to Player II. Then, based on this value, Player II makes a guess
ai ∈ [0, 1] for the value of p and he will pay a loss of |p − ai| to Player I.
Obviously, the goal of Player I is to maximize this loss, while Player II wants
to minimize it.
More generally, let us assume that both players are allowed to follow
what is commonly referred to as a “mixed strategy” in the Game Theory
framework: that is, the choices of the players are not deterministic (“pure
strategy”), but the available actions are selected according to certain prob-
ability distributions. Thus, let Ω denote the set of all probability distri-
butions on the interval [0, 1]. Suppose that when making their decisions,
Player I is allowed to choose µ ∈ Ω and he picks p to follow the distribution
dµ, and Player II picks xi to follow his choice of dσi distributions, where
σi ∈ Ω, i = 0, 1, ..., n.
Therefore, the expected penalty of Player II is
(4.1) E(σ0, ..., σn;µ) :=
∫
· · ·
∫
D(x0, ..., xn; p)dσ0(x0)...dσn(xn)dµ(p),
where D(x0, ..., xn; p) is the penalty function given in (1.1). In these terms,
the goal of Player I will be to find
(4.2) max
µ∈Ω
min
σ0,...,σn∈Ω
E(σ0, ..., σn;µ) ,
while the second player will try to get
(4.3) min
σ0,...,σn∈Ω
max
µ∈Ω
E(σ0, ..., σn;µ ).
Using again the terminology from Game Theory, this is a “zero-sum” game
(that is, the total gains of players minus the total losses add up to zero).
Now, we are looking for the so-called mixed-strategy Nash-equilibrium. The
basic notion of equilibrium in Game Theory finds its roots in the work
by Cournot (1838), but was formalized in the celebrated papers by Nash,
[16]-[17], where the (now called) Nash-equilibrium was established for finite
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games by using Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem [11]. The problem for con-
tinuous games, where the players may choose their strategies in continuous
sets (as in the present case), is more involved.
The following result, establishing the mixed-strategy Nash-equilibrium for
our problem, is a direct application of the Glicksberg’s Theorem [8], who
made use of an extension of Kakutani’s Theorem to convex linear topological
spaces. An alternate method of proof consists in taking finer and finer
discrete approximations of our continuous game, for which the existence of a
Nash-equilibrium was established, and then using the continuity of (1.1) and
standard arguments of weak convergence (for more information about the
successive extensions of the Nash-equilibrium problem, see for example the
monographs [7] and [19]; there are also many papers about such extensions
from the point of view of the applications to Business, see e.g. [14] and [5],
to only cite a few).
Theorem 4.1.
(4.4) min
σ0,...,σn∈Ω
max
µ∈Ω
E(σ0, ..., σn;µ) = max
µ∈Ω
min
σ0,...,σn∈Ω
E(σ0, ..., σn;µ).
For our analysis it is important to make use of the following discretization
of the probability distribution setting in (4.4) related to the second player’s
strategy.
Theorem 4.2. The minimax problem for distributions (4.4) admits the fol-
lowing discretization
min
σ0,...,σn∈Ω
max
µ∈Ω
E(σ0, ..., σn;µ) = min
a0,...,an∈[0,1]
max
p∈[0,1]
D(a0, ..., an; p)
= min
a0,...,an∈[0,1]
‖D(a0, ..., an; ·)‖∞ .
(4.5)
Proof. Let ai :=
∫ 1
0 θ dσi(θ), i = 0, 1, . . . , n. Since
∫ 1
0
|p − θ| dσi(θ) ≥
|p− ai| , we have that
E(σ0, ..., σn;µ) ≥ E(a0, ..., an;µ) .
Then, by the continuity of D(a0, . . . , an; p), we get
max
µ∈Ω
E(a0, ..., an;µ) = ‖D(a0, ..., an; ·)‖∞.
Hence,
(4.6) min
σ0,...,σn∈Ω
max
µ∈Ω
E(σ0, ..., σn;µ) ≥ min
a0,...,an
max
p∈[0,1]
D(a0, ..., an; p)
On the other hand, if for fixed points a0, . . . , an ∈ [0, 1], we take σi = δai ,
it is clear that E(σ0, ..., σn;µ) = E(a0, ..., an;µ) and, thus
(4.7) min
σ0,...,σn∈Ω
max
µ∈Ω
E(σ0, ..., σn;µ) = min
a0,...,an∈[0,1]
max
µ∈Ω
E(a0, ..., an;µ) ,
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but, for some µ∗ ∈ Ω,
max
µ∈Ω
E(a0, ..., an;µ) =
∫ 1
0
D(a0, ..., an; p) dµ
∗(p)
≤ max
p∈[0,1]
D(a0, ..., an; p) = ‖D(a0, ..., an; ·)‖∞ ,
(4.8)
and this settles the proof of (4.5). 
Remark 4.3. The above discretization (4.5) shows that the optimal strategy
for Player II described in the previous section (Theorem 2.2) agrees with the
set of the Absolute Error Minimax Estimators (AEME), using the language
of Point Estimation Theory.
Therefore, our main concern now is the Optimal Strategy for the Player I.
But in this sense, the arguments used in the proof of Theorem 4.2 also have
an important consequence for the Player I’s strategy. Indeed, if we denote
by µ∗ an optimal distribution for the first player and by suppµ∗ ⊂ [0, 1], its
support, then we have
Lemma 4.4.
(4.9) suppµ∗ ⊂M(f)
Proof. It is enough to realize that in the proof of Theorem 4.2, equations
(4.6)-(4.7) show that for an extremal measure µ∗ (for which the Nash-
equilibrium (4.4) is attained), (4.8) is actually an equality and, therefore,
suppµ∗ must be contained in the set where the equality f(p) = ‖f‖∞ =
‖D(a0, . . . , an; .)‖∞ is attained (with (a0, . . . , an) being an optimal choice
for Player II). This establishes (4.9). 
Theorem 4.2 and Lemma 4.4 show that, from this point on, we may as-
sume that both players follow strategies based on discrete distributions. In-
deed, while a Player II’s optimal (pure) strategy will be a choice {a0, . . . , an} ⊂
[0, 1] , an optimal (mixed) strategy for the Player I will be based on an atomic
measure µ∗ =
k∑
j=1
mj δpj , where {pj}kj=1 ⊂M(f) and
∑k
j=1 mj = 1 .
Example 4.5. The case of n = 1 toss.
Because of the simplicity and the symmetry of the problem, the method to
find the strategies satisfying the Nash-equilibrium (4.4) can be carried out
easily in this simple case by using Lemmas 2.1 and 4.4 above. Therefore, we
skip the details.
The optimal discrete strategy µ of Player I is the following: choose the
atomic measure µ =
2∑
k=0
mi δpi , with p0 = 0, p1 = 0.5, p2 = 1 and the
corresponding weights given by m0 = 0.25,m1 = 0.5,m2 = 0.25. Further,
for a0 ∈ [0, 0.5], a1 ∈ [0.5, 1], we have E(a0, a1;µ) = 0.25 and for any a0, a1 ∈
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[0, 1] we have 0.25 ≤ E(a0, a1;µ). Thus, for any σ0, σ1 ∈ we have 0.25 ≤
E(σ0, σ1;µ).
The optimal discrete strategy of Player II is the following: σ0 is the unit
point mass at a0 = 0.25, and σ1 is the unit point mass at a1 = 0.75. The
graph of f(p) = D(0.25, 0.75; p) = (1− p)|p− 0.25|+ p|p− 0.75| is shown in
Figure 8. Since for all p ∈ [0, 1] we have f(p) ≤ 0.25, we conclude that for any
µ ∈ Ω, E(σ0, σ1;µ) ≤ 0.25. So the Nash-equilibrium is established, and if
both players follow the outlined strategies, then Player II pays E(a0, a1;µ) =
0.25 dollars to Player I.
Figure 8. Graph of f(p) in the case of n = 1 toss.
Remark 4.6. Going back to the Point Estimation Theory approach, the re-
sults in previous Theorem 4.2 and Lemma 4.4 admit an interpretation in
terms of the connection between Bayes and Minimax estimators, as men-
tioned in the Introduction. Indeed, Theorem 5.1.4 and especially Corollary
5.1.5 in [13] establish sufficient conditions to ensure that a Bayes estimator is
also a Minimax one, namely, that the average risk (or penalty) of the Bayes
estimator δΛ for a certain prior distribution Λ (see (1.4)) agrees with the
value of the maximum of that risk and, hence, that for such distribution Λ,
the risk function must be constant. If this is the case, the prior distribution
Λ is said to be a least favorable one. In this sense, our results are a sort of
converse of the ones in [13].
When the squared error loss function is used, one could see in Figure 7
that the risk function for the corresponding Minimax estimator is constant
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throughout the interval [0, 1]. In this case, it is proven in [13, Ex. 5.1.7]
that this Minimax estimator is indeed a Bayes estimator with respect to
a continuous distribution supported in [0, 1], namely the Beta distribution
B
(√
n
2
,
√
n
2
)
. Therefore, this last distribution plays the role of a least
favorable one and its corresponding Bayes estimator is proven to be unique,
hence, by [13, Th. 5.1.4], it is also unique as Minimax estimator. Taking
into account our previous results, this least favorable distribution would
represent the optimal strategy for Player I in this case.
The above connection for our absolute error loss function is more involved
and it will be discussed in the next section, where the Nash-equilibrium for
the case of n = 2 tosses is thoroughly analyzed.
5. A constructive proof of the Nash-equilibrium for the case
of n = 2 tosses
Now, we are concerned with the existence and uniqueness of a strategy
pair solving the Nash equilibrium (4.4) in the case of n = 2 tosses. Our
method will be based on previous Theorem 2.2 and Lemmas 2.1-4.4.
Recall that the strategy of Player II is to minimize the maximum of the
penalty function, namely determine optimal outcomes {a∗0, a∗1, a∗2} defining
an optimal penalty function f(p) := D(a∗0, a
∗
1, a
∗
2; p) such that
(5.1)
min
{a0,a1,a2}⊂[0,1]
max
p
D(a0, a1, a2; p) = min
{a0,a1,a2}⊂[0,1]
‖D(a0, a1, a2; p)‖∞ = ‖f‖∞ .
That such an f exists follows easily by a compactness argument.
The strategy of Player I is to find a probability measure dµ∗(p), supported
on [0, 1], that maximizes the expected penalty no matter what the choice of
Player II is, i.e. determine
(5.2) F := max
µ
min
{a0,a1,a2}⊂[0,1]
∫ 1
0
D(a0, a1, a2; p)dµ(p).
Clearly, for any µ ∈ Ω,∫ 1
0
D(a0, a1, a2; p)dµ(p) ≤ ‖D(a0, a1, a2; p)‖∞,
so,
min
{a0,a1,a2}⊂[0,1]
∫ 1
0
D(a0, a1, a2; p)dµ(p) ≤ ‖f‖∞,
which implies, after taking the max over all µ, that F ≤ ‖f‖∞. Then,
our goal in this section is to find an optimal strategy pair {a∗0, a∗1, a∗2} ⊂
[0, 1], µ∗ ∈ Ω, for which the Nash-equilibrium, F = ‖f‖∞, is uniquely
reached.
The main result in this section is stated as follows.
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Theorem 5.1. The Nash-equilibrium is reached if the players use the fol-
lowing strategies:
Player I: Choose p according to the distribution µ =
3∑
i=0
mi δpi , where
(5.3) p1 =
1
3
(
1 +
3
√
1 + 3
√
57− 8
3
√
1 + 3
√
57
)
≈ 0.3611
is the unique real root of the polynomial x3 − x2 + 3x− 1, and
(5.4) p2 = 1− p1 ≈ 0.6389 , p0 = 0, p3 = 1 .
The weights mi are given by:
m1 =
0.5
p21 + (1− p1)2 + 1
≈ 0.325
m0 = 0.5−m1 ≈ 0.175 , m2 = m1 , m3 = m0 .
(5.5)
Player II: Choose the following values ai
(5.6) a0 =
2p1(1− p1)2
p21 + (1− p1)2 + 1
≈ 0.1916 , a2 = 1− a0 ≈ 0.8084 , a1 = 0.5 .
Furthermore, the above pair of strategies is unique in the following sense:
if the choice of distributions {σ0, σ1, σ2, µ} satisfies the Nash-equilibrium
(4.4), then E(σi) = ai, i = 0, 1, 2, and µ =
3∑
i=0
miδpi , where ai,mi and pi
are as above.
The graph of the optimal penalty function given in Theorem 5.1, f(p) =
D(a0, a1, a2; p), is shown in Figure 8. Observe that the interlacing property
p0 < a0 < p1 < a1 < p2 < a2 < p3 holds.
For the proof of Theorem 5.1 two technical lemmas are needed.
Lemma 5.2. The optimal choice {a0, a1, a2} satisfies 0 < a0 < 0.2 < 0.4 <
a1 < 0.6 < 0.8 < a2 < 1. In addition, a1 − a0 < 0.4 and a2 − a1 < 0.4.
Proof. It is easy to check that for the symmetric choice {a0, a1, a2}, where
a0 = .195 , a1 = .5 , a2 = 1 − a0 = .805, we have that ‖D(a0, a1, a2; p)‖∞ =
0.195 < 0.2. Therefore, ‖f‖∞ < 0.2. Since f(0) = a0 and f(1) = 1 − a2
we immediately obtain that a0 < 0.2 and 0.8 < a2. On the other hand,
if there exists p ∈ [0, 1] such that |p − ai| ≥ 0.2, i = 0, 1, 2, then ‖f‖∞ ≥
mini |p−ai| ≥ 0.2, which is a contradiction. Thus, mini |p−ai| < 0.2 holds for
all p ∈ [0, 1]. This implies that 0 < a0 and a2 < 1 (otherwise, the Dirichlet
Pigeonhole Principle implies there exists a p such that mini |p − ai| ≥ 0.2).
The fact that mini |p − ai| < 0.2 , p ∈ [0, 1] , also implies that a1 − a0 < 0.4
and a2 − a1 < 0.4.
To derive that 0.4 < a1 < 0.6 we need only use the values p = 0.4 and p = 0.6
to determine that from mini |0.4 − ai| < 0.2 we must have |0.4 − a1| < 0.2,
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or a1 < 0.6, and from mini |0.6− ai| < 0.2 we must have |0.6− a1| < 0.2, or
0.4 < a1. 
Remark 5.3. While the “test”values used in the above proof might seem, at
first glance, quite arbitrary, their usefulness can be easily shown by a simple
numerical experimentation. In particular, for such a symmetric choice with
0 < a0 , a1 = .5 and a2 = 1 − a0 < 1, we see that the restrictions of the
penalty function f to the “end” subintervals [0, a0] and [1−a0, 1] are straight
lines whose respective maximum values (attained at the endpoints 0 and 1)
are given by a0, and the restrictions to the “central” intervals [a0, .5] and
[.5, 1 − a0], are concave functions. This fact will be used again in the proof
of Theorem 5.1 below.
Now, as a consequence of Lemma 5.2 we have the following result, which
completes the previous Lemma 2.1
Lemma 5.4. For an optimal choice {a0, a1, a2} , we have that {0, 1} ⊂
M(f) .
Proof. Indeed, consider the restriction of f(p) to [0, a0]. Then,
f(p) = (a0 − 2a1 + a2)p2 − (1 + 2a0 − 2a1)p+ a0.
Since the global maximum is attained on [0, a0], and it is not at a0, the
only possibility of it not being at p = 0 is when a0 − 2a1 + a2 < 0 and the
x-coordinate of the parabola’s vertex (1/2 + a0 − a1)/(a0 − 2a1 + a2) > 0,
or 1/2 + a0 − a1 < 0. This implies that a1 − a0 > 1/2, which, as shown in
Lemma 5.2, is impossible if f is the optimal solution of (5.1). Therefore, we
derive that 0 ∈M(f). In a similar fashion, one gets 1 ∈M(f). 
Proof of Theorem 5.1. From Lemmas 2.3-2.4, Theorem 3.1 and Lemma
4.4, we already know that
dµ(p) = β0δ0 + β1δp + β2δq + β3δ1,
for some βi ≥ 0, β0 + β1 + β2 + β3 = 1, and p ∈ (a0, a1), q ∈ (a1, a2). Since
we are in the case of Nash-equilibrium, the quantity
E(a0, a1, a2;µ) = E(a0, a1, a2; p, q) :=
∫ 1
0
f(r) dµ(r)
= β0f(0) + β1f(p) + β2f(q) + β3f(1)
= a0
[
β0 − β1(1− p)2 − β2(1− q)2
]
+ a1 [2β1p(1− p)− 2β2q(1− q)]
+a2
[
β1p
2 + β2q
2 − β3
]
+ β3 − β1p+ β2q + 2β1p(1− p)2 − 2β2q3.
is a global minimum (w.r.t. {a0, a1, a2} ∈ (0, 1)), which implies that
∂E
∂ai
= 0. i = 0, 1, 2.
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Therefore, the coefficients in front of a0, a1, and a2 vanish for the given
choice of p, q, and βi, i = 0, 1, 2, 3. Hence, the optimization problem (5.1)
becomes a constrained minimization problem
Maximize β3 − β1p+ β2q + 2β1p(1− p)2 − 2β2q3
Subject to

β0 + β1 + β2 + β3 = 1
β0 − (1− p)2β1 − (1− q)2β2 = 0
2p(1− p)β1 − 2q(1− q)β2 = 0
p2β1 + q
2β2 − β3 = 0
p, q ∈ [0, 1], βi ≥ 0.
(5.7)
Eliminating β0 and β3 we reduce (5.7) to
Maximize β1p(1− p)(1− 2p) + β2q(1− q)(1 + 2q)
Subject to
 2[1 − p(1− p)]β1 + 2[1 − q(1− q)]β2 = 1p(1− p)β1 − q(1− q)β2 = 0
p, q ∈ [0, 1], βi ≥ 0.
(5.8)
Further, eliminating β2 from (5.8) we derive
Maximize 2β1p(1− p)(1− p+ q)
Subject to 2β1p(1− p)
[
1
p(1− p) +
1
q(1− q) − 2
]
= 1, p, q, β1 ∈ [0, 1].
(5.9)
Substituting 2β1p(1 − p) and denoting x = 1 − p, y = q, we obtain the
minimization problem
(5.10) Minimize
1
x(1− x) +
1
y(1− y) − 2
x+ y
, x, y ∈ [0, 1].
Since 1/[x(1− x)] is a convex function, it is easy to see that if x+ y is kept
constant, the minimum in (5.10) is attained when x = y, which implies that
q = 1 − p (and subsequently β3 = β0 and β2 = β1) is a necessary condition
for a Nash-equilibrium selection. Moreover, assuming x = y, we obtain that
x must minimize the function
g(x) =
1− x+ x2
x2(1− x) =
1
x2
+
1
1− x.
Differentiating, we see that g′(x) = 0 has only one solution in [0, 1], which
satisfies x3 = 2(1 − x)2, or (1 − p)3 = 2p2, so p = p1, where p1 is given in
(5.3). It now follows easily that β0 = m0 and β1 = m1 , where m0 and m1
are given in (5.5).
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Therefore, we have proven that if p = p1 and q = 1 − p1, with 0 < a0 <
p1 < a1 < q = 1 − p1 < a2 < 1 as above, then E(a0, a1, a2;µ) does not
depend on a0, a1, a2, or,
E(a0, a1, a2;µ) ≡ E(p1) = 2p1(1− p1)
2
p21 + (1− p1)2 + 1
≈ 0.1916 .
Keeping in mind the results of Theorem 2.2, it follows that the optimal
strategy for Player II, is given by: a0 = E(p1) ≈ .1916..., a1 = 0.5, a2 =
1− a0 ≈ .8084. The graph of f(p) = D(a0, a1, a2; p) is shown in Figure 9.
Figure 9. Graph of f(p) for n = 2 tosses
Indeed, f(0) = f(1) = a0, and direct but cumbersome calculations show that
f(p1) = a0 and f
′(p1) = 0, and by symmetry f(1− p1) = a0, f ′(1− p1) = 0.
One has f ′(0) = −f ′(1) ≈ −0.38 and f ′′(p1) = f ′′(1 − p1) ≈ −4.43. Since
f is a continuous piecewise-polynomial function whose restrictions to [0, a0]
and to [an, 1] are straight lines, while the restrictions to [a0, a1] and [a1, a2]
are concave functions, it follows that the set of the absolute maxima of f ,
M(f), cannot contain more than 4 points, which are precisely 0, p1, 1−p1, 1.
Thus, ‖f‖∞ = a0 = E(p1) = 0.1916....
Therefore, the Nash-equilibrium (4.4) is established. 
Remark 5.5. The proof of Theorem 5.1, as well as Example 4.5 (the one-toss
case), show that the Nash strategy pair for Players II and I may be seen
as the pair consisting of, the set of absolute error minimax estimators, and
the least favorable prior distribution for which the former become Bayes
estimators. However, unlike the case when the squared error loss function is
used (see Remark 4.6), in the above proof of Theorem 5.1, as well as in the
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discussion of Example 4.5, it was shown that for the current absolute error
loss function, given the least favorable distribution µ there is no unique
corresponding Bayes estimator. Indeed, we have seen that for n = 1 or
2 tosses and for µ =
∑n+1
k=0 mi,n pi,n given in Example 4.5 and Theorem
5.1, respectively, every configuration {a0, . . . , an} satisfying the interlacing
property 0 = p0 ≤ a0 ≤ p1 ≤ . . . ≤ an ≤ pn+1 = 1 is a Bayes estimator
for µ. Does this hold for n > 2? And, furthermore, in spite of the lack of
uniqueness of the Bayes estimator, is our Minimax estimator unique? These
issues will be taken up again in the next section.
6. Conclusions and further remarks
In this paper, minimax type techniques from Approximation Theory have
been applied to a classical problem in Probability: estimating the probabil-
ity of a biased coin after a few tosses. We used the Minimax Estimation
with absolute error loss function to solve the problem, characterizing the
optimal solution and studying the asymptotics of the optimal estimators as
the number of tosses tend to infinity. In addition, the method employed
has been described within the framework of a non-cooperative (in partic-
ular, zero-sum) two-player game, where both players are allowed to make
use of mixed strategies which, in turn, is closely related to the connection
between Minimax and Bayes estimators in Point Estimation Theory. Our
main results are Theorem 2.2, where the optimal strategy choice for the
second player is characterized by means of a property with a striking resem-
blance to a well-known problem in Polynomial Interpolation, and Theorem
3.4, with its Corollary 3.5, where the uniform limiting distribution of the
optimal choices is established. Likewise, the result of Theorem 5.1, where
the Nash-equilibrium for the case of n = 2 tosses is uniquely solved, is also
remarkable.
In view of the results obtained, some further remarks and questions are
noteworthy and will be subject of further research.
• We have shown that the sup-norm of the penalty function for the
optimal choice is clearly smaller than the one corresponding to the
Maximum Likelihood (MLE) choice (i.e. ak = k/n , k = 0, . . . , n ,
see Figure 1), especially for small values of n. But it is interesting
to observe that for a slight modification of the MLE, namely taking
ak = (k + 1)/(n + 2) , k = 0, . . . , n, the results are much closer
to those corresponding to the optimal choice (see Figure 10, where
the initial Figure 1 has been augmented by adding the graph of
the penalty function for the modified MLE). Indeed, this modified
MLE (MMLE) is much easier to compute than the optimal choice
(especially for big values of n) and seems to provide near optimal
results. In other words, if we replace the optimal selection by this
MMLE, a near Nash-equilibrium arises (also commonly referred to
as an ε-Nash equilibrium). This is a well-known problem in Game
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Theory: since the optimal strategies are often difficult to compute, it
is customary to look for easily computable approximations for which
the deviation from equality in the “pure” Nash-equilibrium (4.4)
is small enough. From a Game Theory standpoint, the difference
between pure and near (or ε-) Nash-equilibria consists in the fact
that while in the ”pure” setting no player has motivation to modify
its strategy (corresponding to the optimal strategy pair), in the near
equilibrium setting there exists a small incentive to do it. Of course,
our version of the near Nash-equilibrium using the MMLE only deals
with the second player’s strategy (for more information about near
Nash-equilibrium, see e.g. [6]).
This difference between “pure” and near Nash-equilibrium also
has a counterpart regarding the optimality of the nodes in the sense
of the Lebesgue constant in the context of polynomial interpolation.
Indeed, if the interval [−1, 1] is considered, it is well known that
the so-called Extended Chebyshev nodes (that is, the zeros of the
Chebyshev polynomial Tn+1 adjusted in such a way that the first
and last zero fall on the endpoints of the interval) provide a near
optimal choice of interpolating nodes (see [2]–[4]; see also [21] for a
deeper discussion on near optimal choices of nodes).
Figure 10. Graph of D(a0, ..., an; p) in the case of n = 5
tosses: MLE (green), MMLE (blue), optimal choice (AEME),
(red), and the maximum value of the penalty function for the
optimal choice (black)
• However, Theorem 3.4 shows that, as n increases, the optimal choice,
as well as the MLE and MMLE ones, or any other “acceptable”
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choice (such as, for instance, the SEME, given by (1.3)), all approach
the same limiting distribution, in light of Remark 3.6. In other
words, the advantage of using the optimal strategy over the MLE is
worthwhile only for a small, or not very large, number of tosses.
• In the solution of the Nash-equilibrium for the case of n = 2 tosses
we found that the interlacing property 0 = p0 < a0 < p1 < a1 <
p2 < a2 < p3 = 1 was satisfied. But what about the asymptotic dis-
tribution of the atomic measures
n+1∑
j=0
mj,n δpj,n , with
n+1∑
j=0
mj,n = 1 ,
which give the optimal strategy of the first player for each n (pro-
vided they exist)? Of course, the same question may be posed using
the language of Point Estimation Theory, regarding the pair formed
by the Minimax estimator and its corresponding least favorable prior
distribution.
• As for the equimax property for the optimal choice of Player II (Min-
imax Estimation) given in Theorem 2.2, it is necessary to point out
a couple of pending questions about the uniqueness of the solution.
First, is there a unique optimal configuration {a0, . . . , an} for each
n? And secondly, Theorem 2.2 proved that the intersection of the
set of maxima M(f) with each subinterval (ai, ai+1) corresponding
to an optimal choice is nonempty. But, is there just a single absolute
maximum on each subinterval? It was only established for the case
of n = 2 tosses and numerical results seem to confirm that it also
holds for larger values of n.
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